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Abstract We study the effects on the macroeconomic equilibrium, the wealth distri-
bution, and welfare of adverse selection in private annuity markets in a closed economy
inhabited by overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents who are distinguished
by their health status. If an agent’s health type is private information there will be a
pooling equilibrium in the private annuity market. We also study the implications for
the macro-economy and welfare of a social security system with mandatory contri-
butions that are constant across health types. These social annuities are immune to
adverse selection and therefore offer a higher rate of return than private annuities do.
However, they have a negative effect on the steady-state capital intensity and welfare.
The positive effect of a fair pooled rate of return on a fixed part of savings and a
higher return on capital in equilibrium is outweighed by the negative consequences of
increased adverse selection in the private annuity market and a lower wage rate.
A previous version of this paper formed part of the second author’s bachelor thesis which was awarded the
2011 Netspar Bachelor Thesis Award. It was also joint winner of the 2011 Grote Financiën Scriptieprijs, a
thesis prize established by the Dutch Ministry of Finance.
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1 Introduction
In a seminal paper, Yaari (1965) argues that in the face of life span uncertainty non-
altruistic individuals will fully annuitize their financial wealth. That is, they will invest
all their savings in the annuity market, thereby insuring themselves against the risk
of outliving their assets. However, empirical evidence has revealed that, despite the
theoretical attractiveness of annuities, in practice people tend not to invest much in
private annuity markets.
Several explanations for the low participation in annuity markets have been given
in the literature. First of all, individuals may have a bequest motive, in that they wish
to leave an inheritance to those they leave behind. If so, they will want to keep part of
their financial assets outside the annuity market. Secondly, psychological factors may
play a role. According to Cannon and Tonks (2008), people might feel uncomfortable
to “bet on a long life”. Investing in annuities only seems attractive if you expect to live
long enough, as most of us would hate to die before having received at least our initial
outlay back in periodic payments. Third, private annuity demand may be crowded out
by a system of social security benefits.
A fourth explanation is that in reality annuities may not be actuarially fair, in the
sense that individuals are insufficiently compensated for their risk of dying. This may
be due to administrative costs and taxes or monopoly profits as a result of imperfect
competition among annuity firms. The implications for macroeconomic growth and
welfare of a loading factor on annuities proportional to the mortality rate are investi-
gated in Heijdra and Mierau (2012). Another reason for annuity market imperfection
is adverse selection. The healthier someone believes herself to be, the more likely she
is to buy an annuity. As a consequence, low-mortality (and thus high-risk) individuals
are overrepresented in the annuity market. Annuity firms will have to take this selection
effect into account when pricing their products, as they will incur a loss if they offer
a rate based on average survival probabilities in the population. The resulting higher
prices (or lower return) will induce high-mortality (low-risk) individuals to invest less
in the annuity market.
In this paper we abstract from bequest motives, administrative costs, and imperfect
competition and focus on the adverse selection channel and the role of social annu-
ities. Our work mainly builds on the foundations laid out by Heijdra and Reijnders
(2009). They consider a continuous-time endogenous growth model with two types
of agents differing in their health status acquired at birth, which is assumed to be
private information. The equilibrium in the annuity market is then characterized by
risk pooling among health types which induces the unhealthy agents to drop out of the
market in the last stages of their lives. This pooling equilibrium is slightly dominated
in welfare terms by a hypothetical full-information equilibrium (in which each health
type receives its actuarially fair rate of return).
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We augment the work by Heijdra and Reijnders (2009) in several directions. First,
rather than distinguishing only two types of agents, we model a continuum of health
types. Second, instead of a employing a continuous-time model with endogenous
growth we work with a discrete-time framework in which long-run growth is exoge-
nously determined. This allows us to easily study what happens during the transition
from one steady state to another.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we note that in the absence of private and
social annuities there exist accidental bequests that must be redistributed somehow.
When such bequests flow to the young, private saving is boosted as this constitutes an
intergenerational transfer from dissavers to savers. In this so-called TY equilibrium
the unhealthiest agents typically experience a binding borrowing constraint. Second,
we demonstrate that when a private annuity market is opened up and information is
perfect (the FI case), then all agents will purchase positive amounts of annuities. Third,
in the more realistic case with asymmetric information (the AI scenario), the equilib-
rium in the market for annuities will be a pooling equilibrium in which the unhealthiest
individuals face a self-imposed borrowing constraint and the other agents receive a
common yield on their annuities. Fourth, both in the FI and AI cases the opening
up of a private annuity market causes a ‘tragedy of annuitization’, as described in
Heijdra et al. (2010). Intuitively, whilst it is individually optimal for agents to invest
in annuities, it is not socially optimal. Agents of all health types are in the long run
worse off compared to the benchmark case in which annuities are absent and acciden-
tal bequests are redistributed to the newly arrived young (TY). Fifth, the introduction
of a mandatory social annuity system, while providing a ‘fairer’ rate of return than
the private annuity market, reduces steady-state welfare even more. It aggravates the
degree of adverse selection in the private annuity market and reduces the overall level
of savings in the economy.
Other papers closely related to ours are Abel (1986), Walliser (2000), and Palmon
and Spivak (2007). All three find that the introduction of social annuities accentu-
ates the problem of adverse selection in the private annuity market. In Abel (1986)
a two-period exogenous growth model is developed in which agents have privately
known heterogenous mortality profiles and a bequest motive. Due to adverse selec-
tion, the rate of return on private annuities is less than actuarially fair. In this context,
the introduction of a mandatory (demographically fair1) social security system fur-
ther decreases the return on annuities in the steady state. Walliser (2000) builds on
the work of Abel (1986), but calibrates his model with 75 instead of only 2 periods.
The paper investigates the effects of pay-as-you-go social security benefits on private
annuity demand and shows that privatization (i.e. elimination) of social security low-
ers the loading factor on annuities resulting from adverse selection. Finally, Palmon
and Spivak (2007) argue that a modest social security system may reduce welfare
in an adverse selection economy. The positive effect of providing agents with social
1 In order to avoid confusion we distinguish between individual and groupwise fairness of annuities.
Following Abel (1986, pp. 1082, 1085) we deem annuities to be actually fair in an individual sense if its
expected rate of return equals the rate on regular assets. We call an annuity demographically fair if its
expected return based on a population average survival probability equals the return on regular assets.
123
314 B. J. Heijdra, L. S. M. Reijnders
annuities at an demographically fair pooling rate is outweighed by the negative impact
of increased adverse selection in the private annuity market.
In contrast to our work, however, both Walliser (2000) and Palmon and Spivak
(2007) focus on the features of private annuity markets in isolation and do not take
general equilibrium effects into account. Moreover, the latter fail to specify what
happens to accidental bequests in the absence of annuities and therefore incorrectly
conclude that private annuities are always welfare improving. Abel (1986) on the other
hand does model a production sector with potentially endogenous factor prices and
provides signs for the responses of key economic variables following a change in the
rate of contribution to the social security system. Yet he does not give any insight in
the magnitude of the effect on consumer welfare, nor how it may differ among risk
types. Our contribution lies in providing a consistent general equilibrium framework
for studying the main aspects related to life annuitization and social security. We are
able to both analytically characterize the underlying mechanisms and to quantify their
relative importance through a simulation with realistic parameter values.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the key
features of the model in terms of the decisions made by households, firms, and the gov-
ernment sector. In Sect. 3 we introduce private annuity markets, while Sect. 4 shows
the effects on general equilibrium and welfare when mandatory social annuities are
added to the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Consumers
The population consists of overlapping generations of finitely-lived agents who are
identical in every respect except for their health type. Agents live for a maximum
of two periods, termed ‘youth’ (superscript y) and ‘old age’ (o). At birth each agent
learns her health status as proxied by the survival probability, μ. This is where the dif-
ference between health types comes in: unhealthy agents have a higher risk of dying,
and therefore a shorter expected life span (which equals 1 + μ periods). We assume
that cohorts are sufficiently large such that there is no aggregate uncertainty and prob-
abilities and frequencies coincide. For example, the fraction of young agents of type
μ who die after the first period equals exactly 1−μ. Note that from the perspective of
an individual agent, lifetime uncertainty is resolved at the start of the second period.
When still alive, the agent will live for exactly one additional period.
Labour supply is exogenous. During youth the agent is fully employed while during
old age labour supply is only a fraction λ of the unit time endowment as a result of
mandatory retirement (0 < λ < 1). The expected lifetime utility of a representative
agent of health type μ who is born in period t is given by:
Et (μ) ≡ U (C yt (μ)) + μβU (Cot+1 (μ)), (1)
where C yt (μ) and C
o
t+1 (μ) are consumption during youth and old age, respectively,
β is a parameter capturing pure time preference (0 < β < 1), and U (·) is the felicity
123
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function:
U (x) ≡ x
1−1/σ − 1
1 − 1/σ , σ > 0. (2)
This functional form is chosen for analytical convenience and it implies a constant
intertemporal substitution elasticity, σ . We assume that the agent does not have a
bequest motive such that she does not derive any utility from wealth that remains after
her death.
The agent’s periodic budget identities are given by:
C yt (μ) + St (μ) = wt + Zt , (3)
Cot+1 (μ) = λwt+1 + (1 + rt+1)St (μ) , (4)
where wt is the wage rate, rt+1 is the rental rate of capital, St (μ) is the amount saved,
and Zt denotes a lump-sum income transfer received from the government during
youth. Since the government cannot observe an individual’s health type, the transfer
is the same for everybody. All workers are equally productive so the wage rate is
common to all agents.
If annuity markets do not exist, agents cannot insure themselves against life span
uncertainty. Their only option is to invest their savings in the capital market at a net
rate of return rt+1. Since there is a risk of dying after youth the agent may pass away
before being able to consume her savings, thereby leaving an unintended bequest. It is
not possible to borrow in the capital market, as the agent is not allowed to die indebted.
Hence we impose the borrowing constraint St (μ) ≥ 0. Individuals who face a binding
borrowing constraint have no better option than to consume their current and future
endowments.
For unconstrained agents we can combine the two budget identities to obtain the
consolidated budget constraint:
C yt (μ) +
Cot+1 (μ)
1 + rt+1 = wt + Zt +
λwt+1
1 + rt+1 . (5)
That is, the present value of total consumption (left-hand side) should equal lifetime
income or human wealth at birth (right-hand side). The representative agent maximizes
life-time utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (5). The agent’s optimal plans are
fully characterized by:
C yt (μ) = (μ, 1 + rt+1)
[






1 − (μ, 1 + rt+1)
] [wt + Zt ] − (μ, 1 + rt+1) λwt+1
1 + rt+1 , (7)
Cot+1 (μ)
1 + rt+1 =
[
1 − (μ, 1 + rt+1)
] [
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where (μ, x) is the marginal propensity to consume out of lifetime wealth during
youth:
(μ, x) ≡ 1
1 + (μβ)σ xσ−1 , (0 < (μ, x) < 1) . (9)
We find that consumption during youth and the present value of consumption during
old age are proportional to human wealth at birth. The level of savings depends pos-
itively on the total income received during youth and negatively on the discounted
value of future wage income.
The optimal consumption choices can be illustrated with the aid of Fig. 1. The
line labeled HBC is the household budget constraint as given in (5). It passes through
the income endowment point A which is the same for all individuals. Agents wish
to consume such that the marginal rate of substitution between current and future
consumption is equated to the survival-adjusted gross interest rate:
U ′(C yt (μ))
βU ′(Cot+1 (μ))
= μ (1 + rt+1) . (10)
For the felicity function employed in this paper, the Euler equation is a straight line
from the origin with a slope that depends positively on the agents survival probability,
μ. In the diagram, EE(μh) and EE(μl ) denote the Euler equations for, respectively,
the healthiest and unhealthiest types of agents. The former types consume at point
B which is attained by saving during youth. The latter types, however, would like to
consume at point C but this point is unattainable because it violates the borrowing
constraint. The best such an agent can do is to consume at the income endowment
point A.2
With a continuum of health types, it thus follows that in general not all agents are net
savers in the absence of annuities. In the case drawn in Fig. 1, there exists a marginal
health type μbc,t such that EE(μbc,t) passes through the income endowment point A.
Agents of this type optimally choose not to save anything during youth. Hence, all
relatively healthy agents (μbc,t ≤ μ ≤ μh) are unconstrained whereas all relatively
unhealthy agents (μl ≤ μ < μbc,t) are borrowing constrained and are “bunching” at
the income endowment point A.
2.2 Demography
Let h (μ) denote the probability density function of health types in a given cohort upon
its arrival. Then the distribution of agents in the cohort born at time t can be written
as:
Lt (μ) ≡ h (μ) Lt , (11)
2 We have drawn Fig. 1 such that there are some borrowing-constrained individuals in equilibrium. This
case is consistent with the calibrated example used in this paper. See column (a) in Table 2.
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Fig. 1 Choices of a μ-type individual in the absence of annuities
where Lt is the total size of the cohort. By definition,
∫ μh
μl
h (μ) dμ = ∫ μhμl d H (μ) = 1
where H (μ) is the cumulative density function. The density of μ-type agents alive
at time t is given by Pt (μ) ≡ μLt−1 (μ) + Lt (μ). Assuming that newborn cohorts
evolve according to Lt = (1 + n) Lt−1 (with n > −1) we thus find that:
Pt (μ) = 1 + μ + n
1 + n Lt (μ) . (12)




Pt (μ) dμ = 1 + μ̄ + n
1 + n Lt , (13)
where μ̄ ≡ ∫ μh
μl
μh (μ) dμ is the average survival rate in the population as a whole.
2.3 Government
In the absence of annuity markets we have to make an assumption about how the
accidental bequests left by the dead are redistributed among the agents who are still
alive. We therefore introduce a government sector which collects the bequests and
uses them to finance lump-sum income transfers Zt to the young.3 The government
budget constraint is given by:
3 This is a standard assumption in the economic literature when agents do not have a bequest motive. See
for example Pecchenino and Pollard (1997).
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(1 + rt )
μh∫
μbc,t
(1 − μ) Lt−1 (μ) St−1 (μ) dμ = Lt Zt . (14)
That is, the total amount of accidental bequests (left-hand side) equals the sum of
income transfers (right-hand side).
2.4 Production
The production side of this closed economy features a large number of perfectly com-
petitive firms who produce a homogeneous commodity. The technology is represented
by the following Cobb–Douglas production function:
Yt = 0 K εt N 1−εt , 0 < ε < 1, (15)
where Yt is total output, 0 > 0 is an exogenously given index of general factor pro-
ductivity, Kt is the aggregate capital stock, and Nt ≡ Lt + μ̄λLt−1 is the labour force.
By defining yt ≡ Yt/Nt and kt ≡ Kt/Nt we can write the intensive-form production
function as:
yt = 0kεt . (16)
Profit-maximizing behaviour of firms yields the following factor demand equations:
rt + δ = ε0kε−1t , (17)
wt = (1 − ε)0kεt , (18)
where δ is the constant rate of depreciation of the capital stock (0 < δ < 1).
The general model without annuities is fully characterized by the following funda-
mental difference equation:
kt+1 = φTY1 (rt+1) [wt + Zt ] − φTY2 (rt+1)
λwt+1
1 + rt+1 , (19)
where φTY1 (rt+1) and φTY2 (rt+1) are given by:
φTY1 (rt+1) ≡
1









1 + n + λμ̄
μh∫
μbc,t
(μ, 1 + rt+1) h (μ) dμ.
Equation (19) is obtained by imposing equilibrium in the savings market and using
the cohort size evolutions described in Sect. 2.2. At time t the predetermined capital
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Table 1 Structural parameters and functions
β Time preference factor 0.4128
σ Intertemporal substitution elasticity 0.7000
n Population growth factor 0.4889
ε Capital efficiency parameter 0.2750
0 Scale factor production function 2.4312
δ Capital depreciation factor 0.9158
λ Mandatory retirement parameter 0.6250
h(μ) PDF of the survival probability Uniform on [μl , μh ]
μl Survival rate of the unhealthiest 0.0500
μh Survival rate of the unhealthiest 0.9500
intensity, kt , pins down rt , wt , and Zt , so that (19) in combination with (17) and (18)
constitutes an implicit function determining kt+1, rt+1, and wt+1. The cut-off value
μbc,t is such that St (μbc,t) = 0. From these variables Zt+1 can be computed. In the
steady state we have kt+1 = kt = k̂ such that the level of output per worker ŷ is
constant. As a consequence, the long-run rate of economic growth over and above
population growth equals zero, which is a standard result in an exogenous growth
model without technological process.
Throughout this paper we visualize and quantify the properties of the model by
means of simulations with realistic parameter values. The main structural parameters
are summarized in Table 1. The calibration was done as follows. In step 1, we postulate
plausible values for the intertemporal substitution elasticity (σ = 0.7), the efficiency
parameter of capital (ε = 0.275), the annual capital depreciation rate (δa = 0.06), the
annual growth rate of the population (na = 0.01) and choose a realistic target annual
steady-state interest rate (r̂a = 0.05). Taken together these parameters ensure that the
annual steady-state capital-output ratio is K̂/Ŷ = ε/ (r̂a + δa) = 2.5. In step 2, we fix
the time dimension by assuming that each period lasts for 40 years. The values for n,
δ, and r̂ follow readily from this.4 We assume that mandatory retirement takes place at
age 65, which yields the value for λ in Table 1. Furthermore, we postulate a distribution
for the probability of surviving into the second period and note that life expectancy at
birth of a μ-type agent is given by 40 (1 + μ) in years. In step 3 we choose 0 such
that ŷ = 1 in the initial steady state. This also pins down the steady-state values for
ŵ and k̂. Finally, in step 4 we solve for steady-state transfers Ẑ , the discount factor β,
and the cut-off survival level for the borrowing constraint μ̂bc [satisfying S(μ̂bc) = 0]
such that a consistent general equilibrium solution is obtained. To interpret the result-
ing value for β we note that ρa = β−1/40 − 1 = 0.0237 represents the annual rate of
time preference. In view of the fact that the annual rate of interest is r̂a = 0.05 agents
in this economy are relatively patient.
The key features of the steady-state equilibrium that is attained in the absence
of private and social annuities and with accidental transfers flowing to the young
(abbreviated as TY) are reported in column (a) of Table 2. As was enforced by
4 In particular, n = (1 + na)40 − 1, δ = 1 − (1 − δa)40, and r̂ = (1 + ra)40 − 1.
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Table 2 Allocation and welfare
(a) TY (b) FI (c) AI (d) SA (e) SA (f) SA
θ = 0.01 θ = 0.02 θ = 0.03
ŷ 1.0000 0.9638 0.9473 0.9395 0.9318 0.9247
k̂ 0.0395 0.0346 0.0325 0.0315 0.0306 0.0297
%Q1 3.62 9.10 5.86 3.25 1.23 0.11
%Q2 19.66 20.51 20.66 17.25 13.43 9.14
%Q3 32.96 30.66 32.05 28.94 25.46 21.52
%Q4 43.76 39.73 41.43 38.56 35.35 31.69
%SAS 12.00 24.53 37.54
r̂ 6.0400 6.7500 7.1079 7.2840 7.4632 7.6348
r̂ a 0.0500 0.0525 0.0537 0.0543 0.0548 0.0554
ŵ 0.7250 0.6988 0.6868 0.6811 0.6756 0.6704
Ẑ 0.1146
H(μ̂bc) 0.1029 0.0000 0.0533 0.0999 0.1556 0.2217
ˆ̄μp 0.6418 0.6597 0.6802 0.7035
ĉy 0.6351 0.5261 0.5193 0.5161 0.5128 0.5098
%Q1 26.98 26.56 26.78 26.70 26.57 26.35
%Q2 25.50 25.44 25.40 25.43 25.48 25.56
%Q3 24.26 24.45 24.34 24.37 24.41 24.49
%Q4 23.26 23.56 23.47 23.49 23.54 23.60
ĉo 0.3094 0.3892 0.3824 0.3792 0.3760 0.3731
%Q1 4.05 8.80 3.88 3.98 4.21 4.66
%Q2 14.98 20.16 14.88 14.87 14.83 14.77
%Q3 30.81 30.65 30.81 30.77 30.70 30.56
%Q4 50.16 40.40 50.44 50.38 50.26 50.02
E̂(μl ) −0.2010 −0.3913 −0.4287 −0.4439 −0.4608 −0.4784
E̂(μ1) −0.2717 −0.4107 −0.4858 −0.4931 −0.4994 −0.5042
E̂(μ2) −0.2884 −0.4335 −0.4830 −0.4911 −0.4984 −0.5043
E̂(μ3) −0.2789 −0.4595 −0.4555 −0.4643 −0.4726 −0.4795
E̂(μh) −0.2540 −0.4884 −0.4135 −0.4231 −0.4322 −0.4401
Here %Q j denotes the share accounted for by population quartile j of the variable directly above it. %SAS
is the share owned by the social annuity system. μ j is the upper bound for μ in quartile j , i.e. H(μ j ) = j/4
for j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and μ4 = μh . E̂(μ j ) gives expected utility for an agent with health type μ j
the calibration procedure, output per worker is equal to unity and the steady-state
interest rate is five percent on an annual basis. Steady-state transfers to the young
amount to Ẑ = 0.1146 which is almost sixteen percent of wage income during youth.
Steady-state consumption per worker by the young and surviving old are given by,
respectively ĉy ≡ [∫ μh
μl




Whilst the distribution over quartiles is rather even for youth consumption, it is very
skewed for old-age consumption with the healthiest quartile accounting for half of
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Fig. 2 Steady-state profiles. (a) Youth consumption Ĉ y(μ), (b) old-age consumption Ĉo(μ), (c)
saving/annuity demand Ŝ(μ) or Â p(μ), (d) expected utility E̂(μ)
consumption by the old. More than ten percent of the agents encounter a binding
borrowing constraint [H(μ̂bc) = 0.1029]. The wealth distribution by quartiles (as
evidenced by capital ownership) is very uneven, with the unhealthiest and healthiest
quartiles owning, respectively, 3.62 and 43.76 % of the capital stock.
In Fig. 2 the steady-state health profiles for youth- and old-age consumption, saving,
and expected utility at birth are illustrated—see the dashed lines. The horizontal seg-
ments in panels (a–c) are the realizations for the (borrowing-constrained) endowment
consumers. As expected from our theoretical discussion above, for unconstrained
agents youth consumption is falling in health whilst the opposite holds for old-age
consumption which, like saving, is increasing in health. Interestingly, expected utility
is a non-monotonic function of health.5
5 The downward sloping part has been noted in the literature on health economics. It results from the fact
that, for 0 < σ < 1 and 0 < x < 1, the felicity function satisfies U (x) < 0 so that higher life expectancy
translates into lower expected lifetime utility. The upward sloping part follows from the fact that old-age
123
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3 Private Annuity Markets
Now consider the introduction of a private annuity market in this economy. A (life)
annuity is an asset which pays a stipulated return contingent upon survival of the annu-
itant. In order to compete with other investment products, annuities have to provide a
rate of return which exceeds the market rate of interest to compensate for the risk of
death. The annuity firm is willing to pay this additional return on savings as it is held
free of any obligation after the annuitant has died. Conversely, an agent who sells an
actuarial note gets a life-insured loan and will have her debts acquitted when she dies
prematurely. Hence, an agent who exclusively uses the annuity market for financial
transactions will never die indebted or leave an (unintended) bequest.
It is important to note that an annuity market constitutes just another type of redistri-
bution scheme. Instead of channeling funds from the dead to the newly arrived young
by means of lump sum transfers as above, an annuity market redistributes money from
the dead to those that survive by offering a premium over and above the rental rate
of capital. Therefore, the macroeconomic and welfare effects of introducing a private
annuity market are not a priori clear.
3.1 Full Information Equilibrium
We make the following assumptions about the private market for annuities:
(A1) The annuity market is perfectly competitive. There is a large number of risk
neutral firms offering annuities to individuals, and firms can freely enter or exit
the market.
(A2) Annuity firms do not use up any real resources.
As a consequence of these assumptions the expected profit of each annuity firm
is zero. We start by considering the benchmark case in which health status is public
information. In the Full Information equilibrium in the annuity market (abbreviated
as FI) each health type receives its actuarially fair rate of return and achieves perfect
insurance against life span uncertainty. There is market segmentation in the sense that
there is a separate market for each type of agent.
Let Apt (μ) denote the private annuity holdings of an agent of health type μ. As
the net rate of return on annuities exceeds the rental rate of capital, all agents will
completely annuitize their wealth. This is the famous result found by Yaari (1965).
An annuity firm sells annuities to agents of health type μ that pay a net rate of return
r pt+1 (μ) contingent upon survival of the annuitant. The firm invests the proceeds in
the capital market, thus earning a rate of return rt+1. Since some of its clients will die
young and will subsequently lose their claim at an early stage, the annuity firm can
redistribute their assets among the surviving clientele. The zero-profit conditions for
the annuity market are therefore given by:
Footnote 5 continued
consumption for the healthiest exceeds unity so that felicity becomes positive. Of course, the location of
the slope change depends on the scaling of the variables.
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(1 + rt+1)Lt (μ) Apt (μ) = μ(1 + r pt+1 (μ))Lt (μ) Apt (μ) , μ ∈ [μl , μh] . (20)
That is, the gross return earned on the amount of savings collected from clients of
health type μ in period t (left-hand side) should equal the (expected) claim originating
from surviving clients of health type μ in period t + 1. It follows that:
1 + r pt+1 (μ) =
1 + rt+1
μ
, μ ∈ [μl , μh] . (21)
Note that r pt+1 (μ) is decreasing in the survival probability, i.e. unhealthy agents earn
a higher gross rate of return on their investments in the annuity market than do healthy
agents.
Since 0 < μl < μh < 1 it follows that the interest rate on annuities exceeds the
rate of return on capital for all agents, i.e. r pt+1 (μ) > rt+1 for all μ ∈ [μl , μh]. As a
result rational agents will fully annuitize their savings (as was asserted above) so that
the lifetime budget constraint is given by:
C yt (μ) +
Cot+1 (μ)
1 + r pt+1 (μ)
= wt + λwt+1
1 + r pt+1 (μ)
. (22)
Comparing the TY and FI scenarios [as described by, respectively, (5) and (22)], we
find that for the latter case accidental bequests (and thus transfers from the govern-
ment) are absent and the relevant return is type dependent. The consumption Euler
equation for the FI case is given by:
U ′(C yt (μ))
βU ′(Cot+1 (μ))
= μ (1 + r pt+1 (μ)) = 1 + rt+1. (23)
With actuarially fair annuities and full annuitization the marginal rate of substitution
between current and future consumption is equated to the gross interest factor on cap-
ital. The mortality rate does not feature in this expression because agents are fully
insured against the unpleasant aspects of lifetime uncertainty. This celebrated result
was first proposed by Yaari (1965) in a continuous-time model.
By combining the lifetime budget constraint (22) and the Euler equation (23) we
obtain the following expressions for consumption during youth, the demand for annu-
ities, and old-age consumption:








1 − (μ, (1 + rt+1)/μ)
]
wt − (μ, (1 + rt+1)/μ) λμwt+1
1 + rt+1 , (25)
μCot+1 (μ)
1 + rt+1 =
[





















Fig. 3 Choices of a μ-type individual with perfect annuities
where (μ, x) is defined in (9) above. The optimal consumption choices can be illus-
trated with the aid of Fig. 3. The line labeled EE is the Euler equation (23) which
is the same for all health types. In contrast, there exists a continuum of HBC(μ)
lines passing though the income endowment point A. The lines labeled HBC(μl ) and
HBC(μh) depict the lifetime budget constraints faced by, respectively, the unhealthiest
and healthiest individuals. It follows that the unhealthiest types consume at point C
whilst the healthiest choose point B. Throughout the population consumption patterns
are located along the line segment BC.
Under the maintained hypothesis that a non-trivial macroeconomic equilibrium
exists, two qualitative conclusions can already be drawn on the basis of Fig. 3. First,
since the endowment point is type-independent, all individuals must be net savers dur-
ing youth. (The opposite case with all agents being net borrowers is inconsistent with
a positive capital stock in a closed-economy equilibrium.) Whereas the unhealthiest
agents in the population tend to face a binding borrowing constraint in a world without
annuities (see above), these same agents express a positive demand for annuities in
the FI scenario because the rate they receive on such instruments in case they survive
into old age is quite high [i.e. HBC(μl ) is rather steep]. Second, just as the savings
function is in the TY case, the demand for annuities in the FI scenario is increasing in
health type.
The fundamental difference equation for the FI model is given by:
kt+1 = φFI1 (rt+1) wt − φFI2 (rt+1)
λwt+1
1 + rt+1 , (27)
where φFI1 (rt+1) and φFI2 (rt+1) are defined as follows:
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φFI1 (rt+1) ≡
1









1 + n + λμ̄
μh∫
μl
μ(μ, (1 + rt+1)/μ) h (μ) dμ.
The existence of a well-defined macroeconomic equilibrium is confirmed by the
results reported in column (b) of Table 2. Compared to the TY case, output, the wage
rate, and the capital stock are lower and the interest rate is higher under the FI scenario.
The intuition behind these results is explained in Sect. 3.3 below.
In Fig. 2 the steady-state health profiles for youth and old-age consumption, annuity
demand, and expected utility at birth are depicted—see the solid lines. Youth con-
sumption, old-age consumption, and expected utility are decreasing in health whilst
the opposite holds for the demand for annuities.
3.2 Asymmetric Information Equilibrium
The following assumptions are added to the ones above:
(A3) Health status is private information of the annuitant. The distribution of health
types in the population and the corresponding survival probabilities are com-
mon knowledge.
(A4) Annuitants can buy multiple annuities for different amounts and from different
annuity firms. Individual annuity firms cannot monitor an annuitant’s holdings
with other firms.
Under these assumptions, the Asymmetric Information (AI) equilibrium in the
annuity market is a pooling equilibrium. The existence of this pooling equilibrium
depends critically on (A3): as annuity firms cannot observe their customers’ health
type, they will offer a single rate of return which applies to all their clients. They
can exploit their knowledge about the distribution of health types in the population
in setting this common annuity rate. Note that if (A4) would not hold then annuity
firms could indirectly deduce an agent’s health type by the amount of wealth she
has invested. Healthy individuals tend to save more, which exacerbates the degree of
adverse selection in the annuity market.
Our conclusion that a pooling equilibrium will prevail in the annuity market appears
opposite to that of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), who show that a pooling equilib-
rium does not exist in an insurance market. However, their result relies heavily on the
assumption that customers can buy only one insurance contract such that the insurer
sets both price and quantity. They admit themselves that this may be an objectionable
assumption in some cases, and Walliser (2000) argues that it indeed does not apply
to the annuity market. First of all, monitoring the receipts of annuity payments from
other annuity firms would be very difficult. Secondly, in contrast to other types of
insurance, the death of the annuitant ends the liability of the annuity firm instead of
creating it. Hence, withholding payments and investigating compliance is not feasible.
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We therefore believe it to be justified to assume that the annuity firm can only control
the rate of return on annuities and cannot set prices and quantities simultaneously in
order to obtain full information revelation.
An implicit assumption in the model is that annuitants cannot credibly signal their
health status to the market. In the absence of cheap and credible medical tests, this is
not a strong assumption at all. When asked about her health type, each individual has
a clear incentive to claim to be unhealthy in order to get the highest possible return in
a separated market. However, firms know this and will therefore not believe the annu-
itant’s claim. Hence, even though part of their clientele tells the truth, the fact that
some have an incentive to lie is enough for the annuity firm to assume that everyone
will be a fraud.
We now turn to the determination of the pooled annuity rate, denoted by r̄ pt+1. As
this rate will apply to agents of all health types it does not depend on μ. Assume
that all agents with μ ∈ [μbc,t , μh] purchase annuities, i.e. are net savers. Then the











t (μ) dμ. (28)
As in the case of a full-information equilibrium the gross return earned on the amount
of savings collected from clients in period t (left-hand side) should equal the (expected)
claim originating from surviving clients in period t + 1. It follows that:












μξt (μ) dμ, ξt (μ) ≡ A
p
t (μ) h (μ)∫ μh
μbc,t
Apt (μ) h (μ) dμ
, μ ∈ [μbc,t , μh]. (30)
This result has also been found in a partial equilibrium context by Sheshinski (2008)
and relates to the linear equilibrium concept of Pauly (1974). As noted by Walliser
(2000), it can alternatively be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium among annuity firms
in which each firm that deviates from the zero-profit price incurs a loss.
The lifetime budget constraint for annuitants is given by:
C yt (μ) +
Cot+1 (μ)
1 + r̄ pt+1
= wt + λwt+1
1 + r̄ pt+1
, (31)
where r̄ pt+1 is defined in (29) above. Utility maximization results in the following
expression for the consumption Euler equation:
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Fig. 4 Choices of a μ-type individual with imperfect annuities
U ′(C yt (μ))
βU ′(Cot+1 (μ))




(1 + rt+1) . (32)
In the AI case the marginal rate of substitution between current and future consump-
tion is equated to the expected gross return on pooled annuities. The mortality rate
still features in this expression because agents are imperfectly insured against the
unpleasant aspects of lifetime uncertainty.
By combining the lifetime budget constraint (31) and the Euler equation (32) we
obtain the following expressions for consumption during youth, the demand for annu-
ities, and old-age consumption:
C yt (μ) = 
(










1 −  (μ, (1 + rt+1)/μ̄pt )] wt
− (μ, (1 + rt+1)/μ̄pt ) λμ̄
p
t wt+1






1 + rt+1 =
[








where (μ, x) is defined in (9) above. In Fig. 4 we illustrate the case (confirmed for
the calibrated model) in which not all agents purchase annuities in the AI equilibrium,
i.e. μbc,t > μl . The household budget constraint faced by all agents alike is given by
HBC whilst the endowment point is at point A. For given values of μ̄pt and 1 + rt+1,
the Euler equation (32) depends on the agents survival probability, with EE(μh) and
EE(μl ) depicting the optimal wealth expansion paths for, respectively, the healthiest
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and unhealthiest agents. Optimal consumption choices for the two types of agents are
located at points B and C, respectively. But point C is unattainable because it would
involve going short on annuities, i.e. selling life-insured loans. But the moment an
agent attempts to do so she reveals her health type which results in the borrowing rate
being set at such a high level that borrowing is unattractive. It follows that there is a
binding “self-imposed” borrowing constraint, the HBC is vertical at the endowment
wage wt , and all health types such that μl ≤ μ < μbc,t are bunching at the endowment
point A.6
For all agents featuring μbc,t ≤ μ ≤ μh the demand for annuities is positive and
increasing in the survival probability. It thus follows from (30) that μbc,t < μ̄
p
t < μh ,
i.e. the relatively healthy agents obtain a better than actuarially fair rate of return
on their private annuity holdings (because μ̄pt < μh) whereas the comparatively
unhealthy annuitants obtain a less than fair return (as μ̄pt > μbc,t ). The presence of
unhealthy agents in the market allows the healthy to earn an informational rent.
Comparing the FI and AI cases we find that the informational asymmetry in the
annuity market affects individuals via two related but distinct channels. First, whereas
all agents are net purchasers of annuities (Apt (μ) > 0 for μ ∈ [μl , μh]) under symmet-
ric information, the unhealthiest part of the population typically experiences a binding
borrowing constraint and is thus absent from this market altogether [Apt (μ) = 0 for
μ ∈ [μl , μbc,t )] when information is asymmetric. Second, the pooling rate under
asymmetric information is “demographically unfair” in the sense that it is not based
on the average demographic survival rate in the population of annuitants but on the
asset-weighted survival rate μ̄pt . In order to demonstrate this phenomenon, note that
the demographically fair pooling rate is defined as follows:






where the superscript f stands for ‘demographically fair’ and μ̄ ft denotes the average










Clearly, the demographically fair pooling rate is not sustainable in equilibrium because
annuity firms would make a loss if they were to offer it to annuitants. To see why this
is the case, note that the demand for annuities is increasing in the survival probability.
It follows that μ̄pt > μ̄
f
t and thus 1 + r̄ pt+1 < 1 + r̄ ft+1 for all t .7
6 See Heijdra and Reijnders (2009) and Villeneuve (2003) on this point.
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μ, (1 + rt+1)/μ̄pt
)
h (μ) dμ.
The key features of the steady-state AI equilibrium are summarized in column (c) of
Table 2. As far as the macroeconomic variables (ŷ, k̂, r̂ , ŵ, ĉy , and ĉo) are concerned
the AI and FI equilibria are rather similar. In contrast, the composition of old-age con-
sumption as well as expected lifetime utility differ dramatically for these two cases.
The informational asymmetry in annuity markets leads to a redistribution from the
unhealthy to the healthy agents in the economy. We elaborate on this point in Sect. 4
below.
Finally, Fig. 2 shows the steady-state health profiles for youth- and old-age con-
sumption, annuity demand, and expected utility at birth—see the dash-dotted lines.
Youth consumption is decreasing in health whilst the opposite holds for old-age con-
sumption and the demand for annuities. Expected utility is U-shaped as was the case
for the TY scenario.
3.3 Transitional Dynamics
We assume that the economy is initially in the steady state of the model without annu-
ities. At a given time t a private annuity market is introduced. The transition paths
of the capital intensity and the expected lifetime utility of different health types are
computed by means of an iterative procedure.
The results are given in Figs. 5 and 6 for both the full information (FI) equilibrium
and the asymmetric information (AI) equilibrium in the private annuity market. The
paths for the capital intensity are scaled by the steady-state equilibrium value in the
Footnote 7 continued
and μ̄pt − μ̄ ft can be written as:
μ̄
p




A pt (μ) − Ā pt
] [















where cov(A pt (μ) , μ) is the covariance between annuity demand and health (which is positive).
123
330 B. J. Heijdra, L. S. M. Reijnders














Fig. 5 Capital intensity relative to TY
no annuities case (TY). As such, a value in excess of unity indicates that the capital
intensity increases relative to its benchmark scenario, when it falls short of unity there
is a decrease. For lifetime utility we report the difference with the steady-state values
obtained in the TY case, i.e. Et (μ j ) ≡ Et (μ j ) − E̂TY (μ j ). Table 2 presents
a numerical comparison between (unscaled) steady-state values.
We find that the introduction of a private annuity market boosts the capital intensity
at first but gives rise to severe capital crowding out in the long run. The effects are
more pronounced for the FI equilibrium than for the AI equilibrium. Agents save a
larger part of their income in the first period and therefore consume less during youth
and more in old age. Comparing the lifetime utility profiles we find that comparatively
healthy agents prefer the AI to the FI equilibrium, and vice versa for the relatively
unhealthy.
At the time the annuity market is opened up there are still accidental bequests in the
economy which have been left by the previous generation. Hence, in the first period of
the new regime young agents benefit from the higher return on their savings through
full annuitization while also receiving the intergenerational transfer. Their expected
utility level increases relative to the benchmark. However, from period t +1 (i.e. post-
shock time 1) onwards the transfers are abolished and all health types have a lower
utility level under either equilibrium in the private annuity market than in the absence
of annuities. This is an example of the so-called ‘tragedy of annuitization’, as described
in Heijdra et al. (2010). Even though it is individually rational to fully annuitize (as
the annuity rate of return exceeds the return on capital), this is not optimal from a
social point of view. If all agents invests their financial wealth in the annuity market
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Fig. 6 Expected lifetime utility relative to TY. a Type μl : Et (μl ) , b type μ1: Et (μ1), c type μ2:
Et (μ2), d type μ3: Et (μ3), e type μh : Et (μh)
then the resulting long-run equilibrium leaves future newborns worse off compared
to the case where annuities are absent and accidental bequests are redistributed to the
young. In other words, the introduction of an annuity market is welfare improving
when considered in isolation, but not when the general equilibrium repercussions as
a result of endogenous factor prices are taken into account.
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Table 3 Equivalent variations with private and social annuities
(a) AI (b) SA (c) SA (d) SA
θ = 0.01 θ = 0.02 θ = 0.03
(μl ) 0. 1540 0.1615 0.1700 0.1788
π(μl ) 0. 1835 0.1924 0.2025 0.2129
(μ1) 0. 1335 0.1376 0.1413 0.1441
π(μ1) 0. 1656 0.1707 0.1753 0.1788
(μ2) 0. 1117 0.1160 0.1201 0.1234
π(μ2) 0. 1464 0.1521 0.1573 0.1617
(μ3) 0. 0946 0.0992 0.1034 0.1071
π(μ3) 0. 1297 0.1360 0.1418 0.1468
(μh) 0. 0804 0.0851 0.0896 0.0935
π(μh) 0. 1147 0.1214 0.1277 0.1334
As measures of utility are purely ordinal, the nominal difference in steady-state
utility levels as presented in Table 2 cannot be easily interpreted. In order to evaluate
the magnitude of utility differences in a more insightful way we use the metric of
consumption-equivalent variations. That is, we determine how much additional con-
sumption during youth one would have to give to an agent of a given health type in the
private annuity market scenario in order to make her as well off as in the no-annuities
case, keeping all prices (i.e. the wage rate and the interest rate) and old-age consump-
tion fixed at their initial level. That is, we find that value of (μ) which satisfies the
following equation:
U (Ĉ y (μ) + (μ)) + μβU (Ĉo (μ)) = E̂TY (μ). (39)
where E̂TY (μ) is the steady-state benchmark utility level.
The results are given in column (a) of Table 3. We present both unscaled and
scaled values for the compensation measure, i.e. π(μ j ) ≡ (μ j )/Ĉ y(μ j )T Y where
Ĉ y(μ j )T Y is the steady-state youth consumption level of an agent with health type
μ j in the TY scenario. For example, to ensure that the unhealthiest type of agent
has the same level of utility when there is a pooled private annuity market as when
there are no annuities at all one would have to give her 0.1540 in terms of youth
consumption. This corresponds to 18.35 % of the consumption level she would have
had in the absence of annuities. These numbers are quite significant, showing that the
(negative) welfare effects of introducing a private annuity market in this economy are
not inconsequential.
4 Social Annuities
Following Abel (1986) we now study the consequences of introducing mandatory
social annuities. These can be interpreted, for example, as a fully funded pension sys-
tem. Agents contribute a fixed amount Ast during their youth and receive a benefit
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(1 + r̄ st+1)Ast if they survive into the second phase of life, where r̄ st+1 is the (implicit)
net return on social annuities. All contributions are pooled and invested in the capital
market. The gross return is then divided equally among the survivors. This implies
that the following resource constraint should be satisfied:
(1 + rt+1)Lt Ast = (1 + r̄ st+1)Ast
μh∫
μl
μLt (μ) dμ. (40)
Solving for the implied rate of return yields:




where μ̄ ≡ ∫ μh
μl
μh (μ) dμ is the average survival rate. Intuitively, as contributions
are mandatory and independent of health type, the social annuity system is immune
to adverse selection and forces everyone to participate. This makes the introduction
of social annuities appear like an attractive option for the government: it can offer
agents a higher rate of return on part of their savings than the private market can. Note
that, in general, r̄ st+1 > r̄
f
t+1, the demographically fair pooling rate as defined in (37),
because all agents are forced to buy social annuities whereas not all agents purchase
private annuities (if μbc,t > μl it follows that μ̄
f
t > μ̄).
We assume that the agent can invest her remaining financial wealth in a pooled
private annuity market. The lifetime budget constraint can be written as:
C yt (μ) +
Cot+1 (μ)
1 + r̄ pt+1
= wt + λwt+1






Note that, ceteris paribus, the introduction of social annuities has a positive effect on
the level of total human wealth as μ̄pt > μ̄ for all t due to adverse selection in the
private annuity market. By using (42) in combination with the Euler equation (32) we
find that the agent’s optimal plans are fully characterized by:
C yt (μ) = 
(






















μ, (1 + rt+1)/μ̄pt
) [λμ̄pt wt+1






























Compared to the model without social annuities discussed in Sect. 3.2 above there
are a few noteworthy differences. Consumption during youth and old age are still
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proportional to human wealth, but the definition of human wealth has been augmented
by a term reflecting the relative return on social annuities. From (44) we see that pri-
vate annuity demand has been replaced by total annuity demand, the sum of private
and social annuity holdings. As such, mandatory social annuities do indeed crowd out
their private counterparts. Keeping everything else constant, this crowding out is more
than one-for-one as the higher level of total income in the second period reduces the
incentive for private saving.
We assume that the compulsory contribution to the social annuity system is pro-
portional to wage income during youth, i.e. Ast = θwt with 0 < θ < 1. Note that for
high values of θ agents might be overannuitized, i.e. they could be forced by the social
security system to annuitize a larger portion of their financial wealth than they would
voluntarily do. Since there is a borrowing constraint in the pooled annuity market
this overannuitization cannot be undone by going short in private annuities. Figure 4
depicts a partial equilibrium representation of the effects of social annuities. In the
presence of social annuities the endowment point shifts to point D and the relevant
lifetime budget constraint is given by HBCSA. The thin dashed line connecting A and
D is steeper than the downward sloping segments of HBC and HBCSA because the
rate on mandatory annuities is greater than the pooled private rate (r̄ st+1 > r̄
p
t+1). The
choice set is enlarged for the healthier part of the population, but borrowing constraints
become more severe for the unhealthier (as μSAbc,t > μbc,t ).











































μ, (1 + rt+1)/μ̄pt
)
h (μ) dμ − H(μbc,t )
⎤
⎥⎦ .
The key features of the steady-state SA equilibria that emerge for different values of
θ are summarized in columns (d–f) of Table 2. The larger is the social annuity system
(as measured by the magnitude of θ ), the stronger is capital crowding out and the larger
is the proportion of borrowing-constrained (overannuitized) agents in the economy.
We elaborate on this point in Sect. 4.1 below.
Finally, in Fig. 2 the steady-state health profiles for youth- and old-age consump-
tion, private annuity demands, and expected utility at birth are illustrated—see the
dotted lines. To avoid cluttering these figures, we restrict attention to the case of a
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“large” social annuity system with θ = 0.03.8 Apart from the larger range of borrow-
ing-constrained individuals, these profiles are very similar to the ones obtained for the
AI case.
4.1 Transitional Dynamics
The transition paths of the capital intensity and lifetime utility after introducing both
private and social annuities in the economy (denoted by SA) are given in Figs. 5 and 6
for the case that social security contributions amount to three percent of wage income
(θ = 0.03). We find that, compared to the benchmark of no annuities and transfers
to the young, the capital intensity increases slightly for one period but afterwards
decreases sharply. The overall effect on lifetime utility is negative for all health types,
except for the impact period in which the transfers have not yet been abolished.
In order to evaluate the magnitude of the relative welfare decrease in the steady
state we calculate the consumption-equivalent variations for three different values of
θ , see columns (b–d) in Table 3 and Sect. 3.3 above. Recall that column (a) (featuring
θ = 0) corresponds to the pooling equilibrium. We find that the equivalent varia-
tions increase monotonically in θ for all health types, implying that the equilibrium
becomes progressively worse in welfare terms when the contribution to the social
annuity system increases. At first view this might seem somewhat counterintuitive,
as social annuities offer agents a higher rate of return on a fixed part of their savings
than private annuities do, keeping everything else constant. However, it is exactly this
ceteris paribus condition which is misleading.
Importantly, the introduction of social annuities has two opposing effects on the
rate of return on private annuities. First of all, there is a partial equilibrium effect.
The mandatory investment in social annuities results in a decrease in the demand for
private annuities. Unhealthy agents reduce their private annuity demand dispropor-
tionally more than healthy agents do. As a consequence, the asset share of healthy
agents increases and thereby the degree of adverse selection in the private annuity
market. This leads to a decrease in the rate of return on private annuities, in line with
the findings of by Abel (1986), Walliser (2000), and Palmon and Spivak (2007).
However, there is also a general equilibrium effect which partly offsets the decrease.
The total level of savings decreases in the steady state, leading to a rise in the rental
rate of capital relative to the scenario without social annuities. This response is not
taken into consideration when the focus is restricted to partial equilibrium analysis or
when the interest rate is assumed to be exogenously fixed.
The net effect on the private annuity rate is negative in all our simulations. Over-
all, we find that in the long run the negative effects of introducing social annuities
(a lower wage rate and a lower return on private annuities) outweigh the positive
effect (a demographically fair rate of return on a part of financial wealth) as is evident
from the drop in welfare of future generations.
8 Although this contribution rate does not represent a large proportion of wage income during youth,
the social annuity system is nevertheless large in terms of the private annuity demands expressed by the
unhealthiest agents in the AI equilibrium.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we have constructed a discrete-time general equilibrium model featur-
ing exogenous growth and overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents who are
distinguished by their health status. An agent’s health type is assumed to be private
information. We show that if a private annuity market is introduced in this economy
then it will be characterized by a pooling equilibrium. Due to adverse selection, the
resulting annuity rate of return is less than the actuarially fair pooling rate. Even though
it is individually optimal to invest in annuities, agents of all health types are in the
long run worse off in welfare terms compared to the case where annuities are absent
and accidental bequests are redistributed to the young.
We have also studied the welfare implications of a social security system with fixed
mandatory contributions for all health types. These social annuities are immune to
adverse selection and therefore offer a higher rate of return than private annuities do
under asymmetric information. However, they have a negative effect on steady-state
welfare. The positive effect of a higher rate of return on a fixed part of savings and a
higher return on capital in equilibrium is outweighed by the negative consequences of
increased adverse selection in the private annuity market and a lower wage rate.
Our results suggest that privatization of social security may be welfare improving
when annuity markets are characterized by asymmetric information. Elimination of
social annuities reduces the degree of adverse selection in the private annuity market,
increases the level of savings, and has a positive effect on lifetime utility for all health
groups in the population. In general, lifetime utility of newborns is highest in the
complete absence of annuities provided the redistribution scheme transfers accidental
bequests to the newly arrived young agents.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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